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PRELIMINARY DRAFT
ABSTRACT
This research uses a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of Project Safe
Neighborhood (PSN) initiatives on neighborhood level crime rates in Chicago. Four
interventions are analyzed: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons
carrying or using guns, (2) the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions,
(3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and
social norms messages through justice-style offender notification meetings. Using an
individual growth curve models and propensity scores to adjust for non-random group
assignment, our findings suggest that several PSN interventions are associated with
greater declines of homicide in the treatment neighborhoods as compared to the control
neighborhoods. The largest effect is associated with the offender notification meetings
that stress individual deterrence, normative change in offender behavior, and increasing
views on legitimacy and procedural justice. Possible competing hypotheses and
directions for individual-level analysis are also discussed.
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ATTENTION FELONS: EVALUATING PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO
Driving down interstate I90, Julien passed a billboard just before exit 14B that
read: "Stop Bringing Guns to Chicago or Go Directly to Jail." Julien had seen the sign
before. In fact, it startled him enough to change his normal routine. Typically, Julien
took a Greyhound bus when transporting the illegally purchased guns he sold. This time,
however, he borrowed a car from a friend. During a phone conversation taped by federal
prosecutors, Julien remarked to a gun customer:
And there was a big ass sign when we was coming last time that said, it said, 'Do
not bring guns into Chicago.' ... I swear to God, G. It was a big ass sign. I don't
know if they did it for us or whatever, G. It is a big ass sign, G, coming from
Indiana ... So what I'm a do, is a, I'm a try to find a ride, man.
Unfortunately for Julien, his alternative plan did not work out. Julien, along with three
co-conspirators, plead guilty to conspiring to sell guns to Chicago gang members.
The billboard was posted by Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)
program, a federally-funded initiative designed to bring federal, state, and local law
enforcement together with researchers and community agencies to devise context-specific
strategies for reducing gun violence. In Chicago, this has animated a community-level
mobilization of social and legal institutions to stop the onset and spread of gun violence
in targeted high-crime neighborhoods. Chicago PSN focuses on three broad goals: (1)
reduce demand among young gun offenders, (2) reduce supply by identifying and
intervening in illegal gun markets, and (3) prevent onset of gun violence. Both the
demand reduction and prevention strategies rely on a combination of efforts to increase
the perceived costs of illegal gun trafficking and gun use, and to alter the social norms
and preferences within the social networks of young gang members and other adolescents
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involved in gun violence. The latter strategy includes efforts to change the perceived
legitimacy of law and legal institutions, while simultaneously changing the perceived
likelihood and costs of punishment.
In this study, we use a quasi-experimental design to assess the impact of four of
Chicago’s PSN strategies—increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying
or using guns, lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions, supply-side firearm
policing that increased the rate of gun seizures, and social marketing of the deterrence
and social norms messages through offender notification meetings.2 The results are
promising: homicide rates in the targeted neighborhoods decreased more than 35 percent
in the two years after the program started.
In this paper, we first provide the legislative and programmatic background of the
Bush Administration’s PSN program. A description of Chicago’s specific PSN strategies
comes next. We then turn to an explanation of the gun crime problem in Chicago to set
the stage for a discussion of the theoretical foundations of strategies developed to address
Chicago’s problem. The paper concludes with a preliminary evaluation and discussion of
Chicago PSN to date along with a discussion of next steps in the research.

Policy Cascades and Antecedents of Project Safe Neighborhoods
Although progress has been made in fighting violent crime, America remains far too
violent with a violent crime rate among the highest in the industrialized world. . . . To
reduce gun violence, we must vigorously enforce existing gun laws. . . . By bringing
together federal, state, and local law enforcement, Project Safe Neighborhoods will play a

2

Offender notification meetings are hour-long forums as which individuals recently paroled from prison
are informed about federal penalties for carrying or using guns as well as community resources for
improving their economic, social and physical health among other things.
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key role in reducing gun violence in America, and those who commit crimes with guns
will find a determined adversary in my administration.

Letter from the President, George W. Bush3

Chicago’s PSN initiative is part of a nationwide PSN program that establishes a
“comprehensive and strategic approach to reducing gun crime.”4 Congress allocated
more than 1.1 billion dollars among the 94 federal court districts throughout the nation
specifically to develop PSN strategies to fit within local legal contexts. In each district, an
interagency taskforce overseen by the United States Attorney and comprised of local,
state and federal law enforcement agencies was directed to assess the main factors
driving gun crime in their jurisdiction and then to devise context-specific strategies to
address each area’s “gun problem.” Notably, according to national program dictates, each
district taskforce was urged to network with community partners and researchers in
addition to law enforcement agencies.
One way to understand the impetus behind the national PSN initiative is to situate
it within the burgeoning literature on behavioral economics. At the national level, PSN is
the result of a “policy cascade”5 in which the public discourse around a particular
problem, in this case gun violence, intersects with a salient policy initiative against the
background of a political landscape that is receptive to the widespread promotion of the
relevant policy initiative. PSN thus resulted from public discourse of the “gun problem”

3

http://www.psn.gov/Presidentsletter.html
According to its mission statement: “The goal is to take a hard line against gun criminals through every
available means in an effort to make our streets and communities safer. Project Safe Neighborhoods seeks
to achieve heightened coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement, with an emphasis on
tactical intelligence gathering, more aggressive prosecutions, and enhanced accountability through
performance measures.” http://www.psn.gov/.
5
Here we mean to borrow a page from Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein (1998).

4
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amidst a tough-on-crime political backdrop. In this discourse, there were two salient
policy precursors to PSN: Richmond’s Project Exile and Boston’s Project Ceasefire,
each of which was created in a political landscape receptive to tough demand-side
punishment of gun offenders.
Operation Ceasefire was a problem-oriented policing intervention focused on
reducing youth homicide and gun violence in Boston (see, Braga et al. 2001).6 Project
Exile was started as a collaborative effort to prosecute federally all felon-in-possession,
drug/gun, and domestic/gun cases.7 Both programs were highly touted in the media. The
drop in youth homicides in Boston was so dramatic that it came to be known in the
popular press as the “Boston Miracle.”8 In Richmond, political pundits claimed that the
federal prosecution efforts were responsible for a 40 percent reduction in gun homicides
from 1997 to 1998 (Raphel and Ludwig 2003). Given the emphasis in both of the
programs on targeting the people who use guns and delivering muscular legal responses,
and the current political setting in which such crime policy promotion typically yields
election payoffs (Beale 1997), the stage for national PSN was set. Approximately 600
million dollars were specifically directed towards supply side strategies such as increased
6

A multi-agency working group analyzed police intelligence and determined that approximately 1,300
gang members (less than 1 percent of the youth population under 24) were responsible for 60 percent of all
juvenile homicides in Boston and that most of these homicides occurred in a geographically concentrated
inter-gang retaliations. To counteract the violence, the working group created a “pulling levers” strategy
that concentrated intervention and deterrence efforts law enforcement and community outreach workers
directly on those gangs and gang members responsible for gun violence. In a series of meetings with
different gangs, the Boston group told offenders of their targeted enforcement efforts and made it clear that
should a violent episode occur, they would “pull every lever” available to come down hard on the gang
itself, apprehend the offenders, and prosecute accordingly.
7
Project Exile efforts also included enhanced training for law enforcement and community organizations
and a media campaign touting the “get tough on gun crime” message – a message based clearly on
deterrence.
8
Boston’s crime reduction was termed a “miracle” for two reasons: youth gun homicide deaths were
eliminated for nearly two years, and the coordinated efforts of religious leaders and the police overcame
what Boston’s leaders called the “municipal dysfunction” that paralyzed other cities (Boston Globe, 1997;
Patterson and Winship, 1999; Schweitzer and Latour, 2001)
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background checks, enhanced computer tracking systems, and inter-agency gun
trafficking teams (Braga, Cook and Kennedy 2003). In contrast, 405 million dollars were
allocated towards demand side strategies such as gun-lock programs, school-based
education programs, and media campaigns as well as demand side law enforcement
strategies such as hiring new federal prosecutors and supporting local and state law
directed policing efforts.9
Scholars who study what we have referred to as “policy cascades” caution,
however, that policy generated in this way can be undesirable or even counterproductive
(Kuran and Sunstein, 1998, p. 742). While Kuran and Sunstein discuss risk regulation
generally, Richard Lempert (1984) has made a similar point with reference to a policy
initiative in the criminal context – mandatory arrest as a response to domestic assaults.
Lempert praises the Sherman and Berk (1984) study that drew so much media attention at
the time by explaining its strong merit as a social science study. But, he notes that the
work clearly led to the adoption of either mandatory arrest policies or substantial
increases in the levels of domestic violence arrests in several jurisdictions that was
possibly unwarranted. Lempert highlights the real risks of negative consequences that
follow generalizing from a single (even very well done) investigation. He notes, “[t]he
general point is that the effects of an intervention may depend on the characteristics of
the system in which it is embedded.” (Lempert 1984, p. 507).10

9

More specifically, $130 million was funneled towards non-law enforcement issues, 126 million towards
the hiring of federal prosecutors, and 280 million towards state, local, and community initiatives (Ludwig
2004).
10
The reaction to the youth gun violence epidemic in the early 1990s provides another example of a legal
mobilization gone awry. Nearly every state in the U.S. passed laws to increase the number of youths
transferred to criminal court (Feld 1996; Torbert and al. 1996; Zimring 1999), investing heavily in
deterrence to control youth crime (Singer 1996). But these laws had negative consequences in many states,
compromising rather than safeguarding public safety (Bishop 2000; Fagan 2002; Fagan, Kupchik and
Liberman 2003).
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Indeed, it is not at all clear that one can confidently conclude that Ceasefire and
Exile demonstrate the kind of results that would justify replication in other jurisdictions.
Nor was it clear which aspects of these programs (if any) were susceptible to replication
at all. Evaluations of Operation Ceasefire found a 40 percent reduction in youth
homicides as well as a reduction in shots-fired calls, and gun assault incidents (Braga et
al. 2001; Piehl et al. 2003).11 However, several other researchers whom have reexamined crime data from Boston cast doubt on some of these initial findings (Levitt
2003; Ludwig 2004; Rosenfeld, Fornango and Baumer 2005). These studies cite several
limitations in the Boston evaluation. First, the data are inherently “noisy.” The overall
low numbers of homicide in Boston, an unusually high pre-intervention homicide rate,
and several other violence reduction strategies running concurrently with Ceasefire make
it difficult to attribute the observed decline to any particular intervention. In particular,
the pre-intervention spike in homicides suggests that the observed decline might be
regression towards the mean or simply part of the nation-wide declining crime trend
(Ludwig 2004). Second, the evaluation lacked any real experimental design or variable
that captured the activities of Ceasefire.
Even considering these weaknesses, the evaluation of Boston’s strategy appears
stronger than that of perhaps the more direct forebear of PSN, Project Exile. There was
no formal evaluation of Project Exile, but Raphael and Ludwig (2003), conducted an ad
hoc evaluation of Exile to assess any differences in the observed drop relative to
Richmond’s own long-term trends and similar trends in other cities (also, Ludwig 2004).
Their findings suggest that the observed decline in homicide rates was merely a
11

The drop in homicides, Ceasefire’s architects argued, was significantly larger than the decrease in
homicide rates in other U.S. cities. Based on this evidence as well as time-series breaks, they conclude
that targeted programs were responsible.
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regression towards the mean. In fact, the homicide rate in Richmond increased by 40
percent in 1996-1997, the year prior to Exile’s start. Furthermore, using a difference-indifference analysis of over-time rates in Richmond and other cities suggest that much of
the impressive decline can be almost entirely explained by the large increase in the mid1990’s But a recent analysis by Rosenfeld and colleagues (2005) contradicts Raphael
and Ludwig. Using hierarchical linear models that compare homicide rates over an
extended period of time across a sample of large U.S. cities, Rosenfeld et al. find that the
decline in the homicide rate in Richmond was significantly greater during the Exile
intervention period.
Such divergent findings in Boston and Richmond underscore the paucity of
systematic program evaluation, especially those of experimental design, and should serve
as a warning (or at least a point of ambiguity) of a program’s “success.” Furthermore, the
political nature of such programs often undermines the necessary logical and statistical
conditions for a reliable test of causal effects (e.g., Berk 2005). Yet, despite the lack of
consistent results, the Project Exile model was nonetheless urged upon every federal
district in the United States regardless of the particular violence context in the relevant
city, and millions were earmarked to support it. Moreover, both Exile and Ceasefire were
promoted as national models and generously funded well after homicide rates, including
youth homicide rates, had begun to steadily decline across the nation’s large cities in the
mid-1990s.
These stories suggest that we should perhaps be very skeptical of a program such
as PSN. But there are two important characteristics of the Chicago PSN project that
leave room for optimism that useful policy can grow out of the PSN program. First, the
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target problem for PSN policy in Chicago, gun violence, is likely not plagued by the kind
of availability error that Kuran and Sunstein worry about in their work. Although the
scale of the gun violence problem in Chicago has diminished significantly from the levels
of a decade ago, it remains a serious problem.12 Second, a key element of the national
PSN strategy is to encourage local PSN taskforces to engage a research partner in order
to enhance the link between policy initiatives and results. The idea behind this strategy
element has become common in medicine where “evidence-based practices” are wellknown (Weisburd, et al. 2003). Importantly, the PSN researcher role differs from the
more common laissez faire approach to program evaluation in that the PSN research
partner is expected to actively use available data and research both to help guide program
efforts as well as to evaluate program effectiveness as opposed to simply evaluating the
policy intervention after the fact.13

Chicago PSN Strategies
The engine driving Chicago’s PSN initiative is a multiagency taskforce that includes
members from law enforcement and local community agencies. Participating members
include representatives from: the Chicago Police Department, the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office, the Illinois Department of Correction, the Cook County Department of
Probation, the United States’ Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois, the
City of Chicago Corporation Counsel, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, the
12

In 2002, for example, Chicago had a homicide rate of 22.2 per 100,000, the fifth highest per capita rate in
the country. New York and Los Angeles, cities more than twice the size of Chicago, had rates of 7.3 and
17.8, respectively.
13

Furthermore, the research partner’s funding came from a separate pool of money to ensure that no
contamination occurred—i.e. that the results the research provided, whether positive or negative, would not
influence results or performance.
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Chicago Crime Commission, and more than 12 community-based organizations. Since
May of 2002, representatives of each agency and organization have met on a monthly
basis to devise gun violence reduction strategies for the two police districts with the
highest rates of gun violence described above. The strategies settled upon the taskforce
are both coordinated and collaborative.
As summarized in FIGURE 1, the Chicago’s PSN strategy consists not of a single
initiative but of three dimensions with multiple programs. The top portion of FIGURE 1
depicts a simplified model of offending; the bottom half of the figure shows the
theoretical design of PSN and its point of intersection with the hypothesized offending
process. On the top far left of the figure is the total population of the target areas which
consists mainly of law abiding citizens (non-shaded area) and only a small portion of
persons with prior contact with the criminal justice system (hereafter, simply offenders).
The majority of Chicago’s PSN programming occurs in the first program area, the
community-level, prior to any criminal act. These include: community outreach and
media campaigns, school based programs, and various programs specifically geared
towards known gun offenders. The second and third programming areas rely on law
enforcement strategies focused on supply-side firearm policing as well as multi-agency
case review and prosecutorial decisions. As a set of coordinated responses to gun
violence, these strategies draw upon multiple theoretical frameworks. The obvious
frameworks include deterrence and incapacitation, echoing Project Exile and Boston
Ceasefire. However, as we will demonstrate, models of social ecology and psychological
theories of procedural justice also are implicated by Chicago’s PSN strategies.
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In the present analysis, we focus on four of the PSN initiatives: offender
notification meetings, federal prosecutions, federal prison sentences, and multi-agency
gun recoveries. The first initiative constitutes the taskforce’s major community effort
while the others represent coordinated law enforcement efforts. We focus here upon a
brief description of these strategies.
Offender Notification Forums (henceforth, simply forums) are Chicago PSN’s
most unique intervention, and the one that is most directly consistent with its goals of
changing the normative perceptions of gun crime by the offending population.14 The
forums began in January of 2003 and are presently held twice a month. Offenders with a
history of gun violence and gang participation who were recently assigned to parole or
probation are requested to attend a forum hosted by the PSN taskforce. The forums are
designed to stress to offenders the consequences should they choose to pick up a gun and
the choices they have to make to ensure that they do not re-offend. These one-hour
forums have three segments.
The first segment of the forum contains a strict law enforcement message. For
the first 15 to 20 minutes, representatives from local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies discuss the PSN enforcement efforts in the target areas. Law enforcement
personnel emphasize that the levels of violence in the target communities warrant a
collaborative enforcement effort by local and federal agencies. In addition to
highlighting gun laws specific to ex-offenders, including minimum sentences, conviction
14

We should point out here that the forums are supported by another strategy on the list above: Offender
Notification Letters. All offenders released from the Illinois Department of Corrections now receive a
letter from the PSN taskforce which informs them that, as a felon, he or she is not permitted to own or
possess a firearm or ammunition and any violation could result in federal prosecution with increased
sentences. After the offender reads the letter, they are asked to, but not required to, sign the letter in
acknowledgement of understanding. Signing the letter is not a condition of parolee or release and the
individual may choose not to sign. As of August 2003, all persons presently on parolee or released from
prison have seen and/or signed the notification letter.

11
rates, etc., presenters speak candidly of the directed law enforcement efforts in the area
and the likelihood of ex-offenders being either a victim or perpetrator in other acts of
violence. Law enforcement officials also promote high-profile cases featuring offenders
from the neighborhood that many in the audience may well know and who has been
convicted through PSN enforcement methods.
The second segment of the forum entails a 15 minute discussion with an exoffender from the community who works with local intervention programs. The speaker
uses personnel experience describing how he managed to stay out of jail and away from
guns. The ex-offender is usually an older, former gang-leader who has turned away from
crime and who now works as a street-intervention worker. His message stresses the
serious of the current levels of violence in the community, the problem of intra-racial
violence, the troubles offenders face when looking for work, and the seriousness of the
PSN enforcement efforts.
The final segment of the forum stresses the choices that offenders can make in
order to avoid re-offending. For the final 30 to 40 minutes, a series of speakers from
various agencies in the community discuss their programs and what offenders need to do
to enroll or participate. Programs include substance abuse assistance, temporary shelter,
job training, mentorship and union training, education and GED courses, and behavior
counseling. Often several local employers attend and actual tell offenders the necessary
steps to gain employment with their respective firms. Various literature, flyers, and
business cards are given to the attendees in order to contact—generally free of charge—
any of the services that were discussed. When the forum ends, all of the presenters talk
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and interact with the attendees often staying late into the night in discussion or
counseling.
The other interventions of interest in the present analysis focus on federal
prosecutions and gun recoveries. All of these efforts flow from the work of multi-agency
gun teams and collaborative case review by federal and state agents. PSN multi-agency
gun teams consist of agents from the Chicago Police Department, ATF, the Cook County
States Attorney’s Office, the United States Attorney’s Office, and the City of Chicago’s
Department of Drug and Gang House Enforcement. The goal of the team is to use all of
the resources available to the various members to focus on gun crime in the target areas.
The gun team’s role is to investigate cases surrounding gun trafficking, use, and sales in
the target areas. In addition to investigations, the gun team also conducts gun seizures
and serves warrants on pending cases involving firearms.
In addition to the gun teams, the PSN taskforce set up a local-federal case review
process where local and federal prosecutors met on a bi-weekly basis to review every gun
case in the city of Chicago to determine at which level (state or federal) the case could
potentially receive the longest prison sentence. This PSN case review looked specifically
for cases involving (a) an offender with a previous history of gun violence (b) within the
target area, and (c) accompanying severe or aggravating circumstances are set aside for
federal prosecution. Cases deemed inappropriate for federal prosecutions are still
prosecuted in the state system, and PSN taskforce members stress to the presiding judge
the PSN campaign to crack down on gun offenders in the target areas.15

15

Obviously, the federal prosecution component is relevant to both the community media campaign and the
offender-specific campaign in that these campaigns often highlight a notable federal case.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND PSN POLICY APPROACHES
Chicago adopted the Exile-type program in which lengthy prison sentences for
felon gun carrying would be actively pursued by federal authorities in a geographically
targeted manner. Long federal sentences served in prisons far from home, theoretically,
should incapacitate targeted offenders in order to reduce their lethality in high-crime
police districts. A key question, of course, is the extent of the possible impact of this
program element given that any incapacitation effect from the program would have to
exist over and above the incapacitative effect that would exist in the ordinary course
flowing from the state prosecution baseline (Levitt 2003).
Severe federal sentences, along with an increased certainty of federal
punishment, theoretically should alter a gun carrying felon’s rational assessment of the
legal risks of gun offending so to specifically deter him from that act. As a general
matter, effective deterrence strategies stress the severity, certainty, and swiftness of the
sanction (e.g., Tittle and Rowe 1974; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Federal gun
sentences are often more severe than correlative state sanctions for the same gun offense.
Moreover, the thrust of PSN law enforcement strategy is to increase the number of such
federal prosecutions – at least against offenders in the target districts. This approach
increases the certainty of punishment.16 Forums also are relevant to deterrence in that
they make salient to the targeted group information regarding the increased number of
federal prosecutions and lengthy federal sentences, or what some have considered to be
the “missing link” in deterrence research (Kleck et al. 2005).

16

It is not obvious whether any PSN strategy specifically address the swiftness of punishment.
Anecdotally we are aware the state gun prosecutions in Chicago have in the past been commonly continued
by defense attorneys for months melting into years in some cases. Federal judges, we are told, do not
usually tolerate such lax practices.
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Whether or not an approach targeting crime-prone individuals is successful
depends a great deal upon whether these individuals will be deterred by the threat of
sanctions. Wright et al. (2004) summarize four different deterrence perspectives that
address this question. The first perspective is the classic deterrence model that deems
individual criminal propensity is irrelevant to the effectiveness of a threat of legal
sanction. According to this familiar theory, individuals seek to maximize utility and
partake in some hedonistic calculus of the ends and means of committing a crime. From
this rational-actor perspective, increasing penalties associated with a crime ipso facto
increases the cost of the crime and decreases the likelihood that an individual will choose
to commit a crime. According to such logic, the threat of punishment affects everyone
equally.
A second perspective is drawn from self-control theories (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990; Wilson and Hernstein 1985) and predicts that law enforcement strategies are less
likely to deter those more prone to commit crimes because their impulsive, risk-taking,
and present-oriented nature inures them to the threat of sanctions (Becker 1968; Nagin
and Paternoster 1994; Nagin and Pogoarsky 2001; Wright et al. 2004). Self-control
theorists believe that crime-prone individuals are more impulsive and interested in
immediate gratification than other people are. In other words, they do not respond as a
rational actor with a normal discount rate. If this is true, then deterrence strategies like
Chicago’s PSN approach should be less effective in deterring crime among hardened
offenders as compared to so-called law abiders whom self-control theorists expect to be
rational actors whose behavior conforms to the classical model.
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A third perspective is the converse of the second—increasing the costs of crime
will have a greater effect on those who are crime-prone than those who are not (Parsons
1937; Silberman 1976; Tittle 1980; Toby 1964). The reason is that individuals who are
strongly tied to conventional norms simply are not affected by sanction threats. In this
account, it is the law abiders who are, in a sense, immune to the threat of sanction, but not
because they are impulsive and without self-control; rather, it is because law-abiders are
highly unlikely to offend in the first place due to their internalized commitment to
compliance. The threat of crime, then, only is a cost to those who are actively engaged in
an offending or criminal lifestyle, whom this perspective’s adherents hypothesize are
rational actors.17 Because the criminally prone potentially will be subject to legal
sanctions, they pay closer attention to the costs of doing crime, assuming that they have
access to information about higher potential costs with no offset from higher potential
crime payoffs. For everyone else, such matters are irrelevant.
A final perspective combines the previous two by suggesting that the effect of
threats varies in an inverted “U”-shaped pattern of criminal propensity. At either end of
the curve either those who are highly socialized into pro-social norms or those highly
socialized into criminality (such as professional thieves) are located increasing the costs
of sanctions is unlikely to effectively deter criminal behavior. However, those located
along the middle section of the curve, those who are neither strongly tied to conformity or
crime potentially respond to legal threats. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) call members of
this group “marginal offenders” because their criminal propensity is wavering and plastic.

17

Wright et al. (2004) offer a clever metaphor of this perspective: “A restaurant owner can sell more prime
rib by lowering its price, but not to vegetarian patrons. The price of prime rib here represents the
situational inducement toward ordering meat, but vegetarianism represents a predisposition away from it,
and thus the effect of meat pricing significantly varies by level of meat eating” (pg. 184).
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The PSN strategies are consistent with the theory in which strategy promoters
expect offenders who attend an offender notification meeting and who may be subject to
federal prosecution to desist from gun offending as a result of the intervention. However,
the empirical research relevant to the classification of offending populations according to
the perspectives laid out above is not clear. Qualitative research on active offenders
shows support on both extremes. On the one hand, several important studies demonstrate
that offenders, and even “professional” criminals, often act irrationally, without planning,
and with complete disregard for the legal consequences (Fenny 1986; Shover 1996;
Wright and Decker 1994). For example, Decker and Wright (1994) found that more than
two-thirds of professional burglars in St. Louis simply never thought about the fact of
getting caught.
On the other hand, qualitative research also shows that at least some offenders
modify their behavior for the fear of getting caught and attempt to minimize their risk
accordingly (Cusson and Pinsonneault 1986; Decker, Wright and Logie 1993; Piquero
and Rengert 1999; Walsh 1986). Ludwig (2004), for example, cites data from an ongoing multi-methods study of gun markets in Chicago that drug dealing gang members
dissuade the presence of firearms near drug spots because of the negative attention it
draws from police.18
More specifically relating to gun violence, these findings and others by Levitt
(2002) and Wright and Rossi (1985) show that at least some proportion of gun offenders
act rationally when it comes to weighing the threats of sanction against he costs of crime
and attempt to minimize their risks of being caught accordingly (also, Cook, Molliconi
18

Moreover, Ludwig notes that police actively engage an informal gun deterrence strategy with gang
members by letting them know that while drug dealing may be quasi-acceptable from the normative
standpoint of the community, gun violence is not.
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and Cole 1995; Wright et al. 2004). That is, increasing the severity and potentially the
certainty of sanctions at least changes behaviors of some criminal prone individuals and
(quite possibly) affects the normative expectations of gun use by raising the costs.
Indeed, the opening vignette to this paper demonstrates an effort by an offender to change
his behavior in order to avoid sanction.
Another theoretical framework is important to evaluation of PSN strategies.
While deterrence theories assume that individuals complying with the law because they
fear the consequences of failing to do so, norm-based theories grounded in social
psychology of compliance connect voluntary compliance with the law to the fact that
individuals believe the law is “just” or because they believe that the authority enforcing
the law has the right to do so (Tyler 1990). These factors are considered normative
because individuals respond to them differently from the way they respond to rewards
and punishments. In contrast to the individual who complies with the law because she is
responding to externally imposed punishments, the individual who complies for
normative reasons does so because she feels an internal obligation. It is “the suggest[ion]
that citizens will voluntarily act against their self-interest [that] is the key to the social
value of normative influences.” (Tyler 1990, p. 24).
The architecture of the offender notification meetings makes these theories
relevant. While deterrence theory emphasizes the fact that the law enforcement message
is conveyed to recently paroled gun offenders, norm-based theories of compliance
emphasize both the content of the message conveyed to attendees in its entirety (the law
enforcement message, the ex-offender transition, and the community organization
message) and the manner of the conveyance.
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Consider the message conveyance first. The forums are held in a neutral and
pleasant location, typically a public building in a local park. In fact, PSN taskforce
members specifically rejected law enforcement facilities as a setting for the forums.
Additionally, the room in which the forum takes place is set up in an egalitarian
“roundtable” style. Chairs are set up in a square, and all intentionally are set on a level
plane.
Now consider the content of the message. All three components of the message
matter to the procedural justice account. If only deterrence were important, then the
subsequent messages would be irrelevant. Yet, the PSN taskforce members believe – a
belief consistent with theory – that each message component is necessary to emphasize
the agency of the individuals in question who are capable of choosing appropriate paths
in life.
These features of the forums find resonance in psychologist Tom Tyler’s work
developing a process-based model of regulation (Tyler 2003). The process-based model
of regulation argues that whether or not people comply with the law as a general matter
or in specific instances – say, in particular encounters with law enforcement officials – is
powerfully determined by people’s subjective judgments about the fairness of the
procedures through which the police and the courts exercise their authority. This model
of compliance is explicitly psychological. That is, while it is true that people can be
compelled to obey laws and rules through the use of threats by government authorities, it
is also true that government authorities can gain the cooperation of the people with whom
they deal through “buy-in” (Tyler, 2003, p. 286). Importantly, threats do not usually lead
to “buy-in.” What does? Treating people with respect and dignity.
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While there are no examples in the literature that are exactly analogous to the
offender notification forums, two studies are relevant. One study by Paternoster and his
colleagues (1997) focuses upon men who dealt with police because of domestic violence
calls. Paternoster et al. demonstrate that when police regularly treated such arrestees with
courtesy, such as not handcuffing them in front of the victim, those arrestees were more
likely than those who were not so treated to view police as legitimate. Moreover, the
arrestees treated with respect demonstrated lower recidivism rates for domestic violence
than those who were not so treated. Another study may be more familiar than the former.
The Re-Integrative and Shaming Experiments (RISE) in Canberra deliberately trade on
the value of a different sort of architecture from the more typical formal court processing
in order to address criminal incidents. RISE features restorative justice conferences in
which “[a] problem [is placed] in the centre of the circle rather than putting the criminal
at the centre of the criminal justice system.” The participants in the conference typically
include the young offender and him or her family and supporters, the victim and his or
her family and supporters, a police officer and a youth advocate. The participants sit in a
circle and the discussion proceeds by first having the offender speak, then the victim, and
finally reaching a disposition through consensus. No lawyers are allowed.
It is important to note the lack of physical hierarchical structure in the restorative
justice conference. Sentences are not imposed by state officials sitting above everyone
else and controlling the show. Instead all of the participants sit on the same plane facing
one another. The state official typically participating – a police officer – has no special
role of power, but rather sits in the circle just as everyone else. And, it is the group
together (including the offender), not the state’s representative alone, who work out the
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disposition. Finally, in contrast to the traditional sentence, which relies on threat of
coercion to insure that an offender carries out a sentence (revocation of probation, for
example), restorative justice imposes sentences that the offender herself agrees to and
thinks is fair.
Studies of various restorative justice programs reveal many successes. There are
extremely consistent reports of victim satisfaction with restorative justice experiences
(Braithwaite 1999). Offenders have been found to respond to restorative justice
programs because they perceive them as just. There are a limited number of studies
indicating that restorative justice processing is associated with lower reoffending levels
when participants are compared to those in control groups, but more work must be done
to verify this effect (Ibid.). Still, the work done so far provocatively suggests that
procedural justice mechanisms could be at play in Chicago.
Finally, and briefly, the theoretical framework most pertinent to the effect of
multi-agency gun seizures on crime is simply the expected effect of a reduction in the
supply of guns. If one believes that a ready supply of guns contributes to the homicide
rate by insuring that those who are prone to violence have available to them a very lethal
technology, then one might expect that removing this opportunity would reduce crime or
at least the lethality of it. Reduction of the lethality of crime would take place because, in
the face of a restricted supply of very effective technology such as guns, one might
expect violence-prone individuals to substitute to a less lethal instrument such as a knife
or fists. In this account there are fewer homicides but very possible no fewer violent
events. Note, however, if normative change occurs as a result of the forums, then the
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kinds of displacement to less lethal implements we describe here would likel not take
place.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Design
Because political and logistic factors hindered the establishment of a true
randomized experiment, we designed this research as a quasi-experimental panel model
measuring treatment effects and using a near-equivalent control group (Shadish, Cook
and Campbell 2002). Treatment and control districts were selected non-randomly from
the city’s 25 police districts based mainly on the concentration of homicide and gun
violence. Two adjacent police districts were selected as PSN treatment districts and two
others were used as near-equivalent control groups.19
“Subjects” in each group were 54 police beats, each approximately one-square
mile and with approximately 8,000 residents. Police beats, which generally coincide with
residents’ perception of a “neighborhood,” are ecologically bounded by major
intersections, highways, and parks. TABLE 1 summarizes basic crime and social
indicators of the treatment and control districts, with summary statistics computed for the
beats within the treatment and control areas. FIGURE 2 displays the geographic
distribution of gun seizures and homicides in 2002 in the entire city, and illustrates the
concentration of gun violence in the study districts.
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Analysis was also conducted using the median neighborhoods and the entire city as a control group.
Doing so had little affect on the direction, magnitude, and significance of the parameter estimates vis-à-vis
other variables in the model. In fact, parameter estimates were actually larger under these conditions. The
control groups used in the present analysis, therefore, provide the most conservative estimates and also
satisfy the basic conditions of the research design described below.
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The PSN group consists of a cluster 24 police beats on the West-Side of Chicago.
Shown in FIGURE 2, this area has the highest concentration of homicide and gun
recoveries in the city. Not surprisingly, both are statistically and spatially correlated
signaling the non-random distribution of violence and gun crime in Chicago (Moran’s I =
.378). The homicide rate (75.5) and gang-related homicide (13.8) rate in this area are
three times the city average (TABLE 1).The PSN area has the highest per capita gun
recovery rate in the city (620.8 per 100,000). It also has a long history of gang violence
and is the birthplace of a large conglomerate of African-American gangs, the Almighty
Vice Lord Nation (see, Knox and Papachristos 2002). The area is predominately African
American (97 percent) with rates of poverty (35 percent), public assistance (17 percent),
and single mother households (24 percent) more than twice those of other areas of the
city.
Politically, this PSN treatment area was selected precisely because it was the
“worst” area of the city. Because the limited resources of the program prohibited a citywide intervention, the Taskforce decided to go “where the problem is.” And while the
data generally support this political view, it meant that the random assignment of districts
within the city or beats within the PSN area was not possible.
The control districts and beats were selected to approximate the high homicide
and gun violence patterns of the PSN areas, but were geographically and socially
separated from the treatment area to avoid contamination.20 We selected a cluster of 30
police beats in two police districts on the South-Side of the city in areas with social and

20

Although not shown in the map, two major expressways and a cluster of Hispanic neighborhoods further
distinguish these two parts of the city. Moreover, there is a qualitative distinction between the “West-Side”
and “South-Side” insofar as they constitute a parochialism with some distinct tradition, both within the
gang milieu and a larger community context (e.g., Hunter 1985).
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crime indicators comparable to the PSN treatment group. TABLE 1 shows that crime rates
in the control beats in 2002 (the year the Taskforce selected PSN) were lower than the
PSN treatment area, but control group homicide rates were more than twice the city
average. In part, these lower rates are a function of the larger and slightly more diverse
population.
The neighborhood history in the control area is comparable to the PSN area. The
control area is the birthplace of a conglomerate of African-American gangs, the Black
Gangster Disciple Nation (Papachristos 2001). Its social and demographic characteristics
are similar to those of the PSN treatment group: the area is predominately African
American (80 percent) with rates of poverty (33 percent), public assistance (14 percent),
and single mother households (18 percent) that far exceeds city averages.
To rule out the possibility that any observed effect was simply regression towards
the mean, we also ensured (a) that neither group was in the midst of a unique upswing in
their homicide rate and (b) that the relationship between the two areas was historically
stable. FIGURE 3 shows the annual homicide totals from 1991 to 2005 for the treatment
and control groups and the city totals without these groups. FIGURE 3 shows that the
treatment group has had the highest levels of homicide in the city for the past 15 years;
the control groups had the second highest. The distance and ranking of these two groups
within all police districts in the city are fairly stable over the time period. They both
follow the same trajectory: an overall decline from 1991, slight peak in 2002, and then
another decline towards 2005.21 The city’s other police districts follow a similar trend
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It is important to note that the scale of this figure (years) makes it look as though the drop in the PSN
districts occurs directly before the intervention districts. However, looking at monthly and quarterly data—
as seen below—allows for a more precise timing of this drop. The observation period in the analysis
encompasses both the rise and subsequent fall during this time period.

24
but the total numbers fall dramatically when these groups are removed from the overall
total. This suggests that the trends in both the treatment and control groups, in large part,
drive the overall homicide numbers in Chicago.
After selecting the assignment groups, we established a panel model of police
beats of the entire city. Data were collected for the 72 month period from January 1999
to December 2004 and collapsed to 24 quarter time periods for analysis. Data come from
multiple sources including the Chicago Police Department, ATF, and the Illinois
Department of Corrections. In the next sections, we describe the outcome, control, and
dosage measures.

Dependent Variables
To assess the impact of PSN interventions, we use measures of lethal and nonlethal criminal violence: homicides and aggravated batteries and assaults.22 Given PSN’s
explicit focus to reduce gun violence and, more specifically, gun homicide, we estimate
treatment impacts on beat-level gun and total homicide rates

Homicide totals were

computed from incident level police records geocoded to the beat-level by the address of
the incident. In addition to total rates, we also disaggregate by whether a firearm used in
the homicide and whether the homicide was gang-related. Following the logic of PSN,
we hypothesize that gun homicide and total homicide rates will be lower over time in the
PSN areas, and the differences are related both to the main effects of the program and to
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720 ILCS 5/12-2 Aggravated Assault. 720 ILCS 5/12-3 Aggravated Battery. Assaults are those crimes in
which a person engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.
Aggravated assaults are committed with a weapon such as a gun. In contrast, a battery is committed when
a person engages in conduct that actually harms another.

25
the dosages of each program component. The log of the beat-level homicide rate is used
to improve model fit.
The beat-level, firearm-involved aggravated assault and aggravated battery arrest
rates are also used as an outcome. This data are created from incident-level police
records that were geocoded to the police beat. Again, we hypothesize a negative
relationship between these outcomes and PSN dosage variables. The log of aggravated
assaults and aggravated batteries are used to improve model fit.

Neighborhood Social Indicators
To control for differences in the social structural composition of PSN and control
areas, we used variables taken from the 2000 Census. Following a rich body of research
(e.g., Fagan and Davies 2004; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson,
Raudenbush and Earls 1997), we used principle components factor analysis to reduce 12
census variables to three factors. TABLE 2 shows that the three factors reflect ecological
dimensions commonly associated with homicide: Social Deprivation, Immigration, and
Residential Stability.23 Based on previous research, we hypothesize that the Social
Deprivation and Residential Stability factors to be positively associated with homicide
and violence, and Concentrated Immigration to be negatively associated with these
outcomes. Furthermore, given the spatial concentration of both crime and poverty in the
same Chicago neighborhoods, as well as the city’s history of high levels of racial
residential segregation, we also anticipate these factors to be highly correlated with
homicide and therefore with selection as a PSN district.
23

The factor loadings of Census variables at the police beat are remarkably similar to the similar factors
created at the “neighborhood” level found in other Chicago research (e.g., Morenoff, Sampson and
Raudenbush 2001; e.g., Papachristos and Kirk 2005; Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999).
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PSN Measures
Six measures of PSN intervention reflect the program design: a dummy variable
indicating group assignment, the percentage of gun offenders in the areas who have
attended a notification meeting, the number of federal prosecutions, the person-month
sentences of federal prosecutions, the number of ATF gun seizures, and a composite
index of each of these measures.

The dummy variable is a simple measure of group

assignment. The other measures reflect specific program dimensions.

Notification Meetings. This variable captures a saturation effect associated with
disseminating information about the severity, certainty, and likelihood of PSN
interventions among the population most at risk of being a victim of or committing a gun
crime—known gun offenders in the treatment group. The measure is a proxy for the
spread of information through offender networks functioning as information markets
sharing ideas and norms. It is calculated as a raw percentage of the number of offenders
who have attended the forum out of the total number of gun offenders on parole within
the target area; monthly adjustments were made to the denominator to account for
recidivism and re-entry back into the area.
This intervention was limited to offenders within the PSN area. It began in
January 2003 and reached its maximum (47 percent) at the end of the data collection
period in December 2004.24 Parolees were randomly selected to attend a forum based on
three conditions: (1) residence in the PSN area; (2) having had at least one weapons
related offense in their conviction history; and (3) having been released from prison in the
24

This intervention was later expanded to other areas in the city but that does affect the present data.
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prior nine months. Parolees were invited by a letter mailed to their residence and a
follow-up call from their parolee officer. And, although participation was not mandatory,
attendance was nearly 98 percent. Those who missed a forum often came to the next
available meeting. Meetings were held bimonthly. We hypothesize that an increasing
the percentage of offenders in the target areas who have attended a forum should have a
negative relationship on the outcome variables.

Federal Prosecutions.

Increased federal prosecutions for firearm cases

operationalize the deterrence component of PSN, and, following the example of
Richmond’s Project Exile, were one of its central initiatives. Whereas the forums were
designed to communicate a general deterrent threat, the reality of prosecutions served as a
manifestation of that threat. The deterrent effect of increased rates of prosecution with
the expectation of long and harsh punishment terms should have a negative affect on
crime rates. Although cases from the PSN districts were given priority for this
intervention, federal prosecutions were not limited to the treatment area. Accordingly,
the distributions were skewed, and we use the logged total number of prosecutions per
police beat as an indicator of the increased activity in this PSN domain over the
observation period.

Length of Federal Sentences. Federal prison sentences are expected to have both
incapacitation and deterrence effects. Incapacitation is theorized to reduce crime by
keeping off the streets those offenders most likely to commit further gun violence and, by
doing so, ipso facto reduce future gun crime rates. Because gun homicide in Chicago is
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disproportionately committed by those with prior violent convictions, this dimension of
PSN strategy should reduce homicide and non-lethal violence by removing those most
responsible for these crimes.
These effects should be amplified by the differences between federal and
state/local prison terms. Federal sentencing guidelines for firearm crimes generally yield
longer sentences, the term may be carried out in prisons far from an offender’s home, and
there is no possibility of federal parole. The deterrent effects of these sentences were
broadcast to the general public in various PSN publicity efforts (billboards, radio
advertisements, etc.) and to those with the highest propensity for gun violence via
potential gun offenders at the PSN forums. Accordingly, we used the actual prison
sentences of those convicted in PSN cases as a measure of its incapacitative effects. We
measure this intervention as the log of person-month sentences at the beat level. Similar
to the prosecution variable, this variable is not limited to the treatment group.

Gun Seizures. We measure the supply-side strategies of PSN as the number of
ATF gun seizures per police beat per quarter. As seen in FIGURE 2, ATF gun seizures are
spread throughout the city but the treatment and control areas consistently report the
highest number of gun recoveries. Given the increased attention to gun trafficking and
gun crimes in the PSN districts, it is reasonable to expect that the number of recoveries in
the treatment group would continue to be high and possibly increase. As such, we
hypothesize that as gun seizures increases, levels of violence should decrease.
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Index of PSN Components. Theoretically, as seen in FIGURE 1, each of the PSN
components was designed to work together. For example, speakers at the parolee forums
used PSN prosecutions and ATF gun trafficking cases as colorful illustrations of the
consequences gun offending in the target area. To capture the cumulative effects of the
PSN components, we created an additive index of PSN components based on where a
police beat falls on the quintile of each of the previous intervention measures for each
calendar quarter. The index can theoretically range from zero to twenty, but no beat has a
score less than three since all of the interventions except the parolee forums extend
beyond the treatment areas. FIGURE 4 displays the distribution of this index. The righthand skew on this variable in the treatment group reflects presence of the parolee forums
and the increased attention from prosecutions and firearm recoveries in the treatment
area.

Analysis
We estimate models of beat-level change during the 72 month period that is
associated with the PSN interventions, controlling for social indicators, spatial
autocorrelation, and the probability (propensity) of group assignment. Analysis proceeds
in two-stages. First, we use propensity scores to assess the probability of group
assignment in order to allay some of the problems of non-random group assignment (see,
for example, Berk, Li and Hickman 2005; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Second, we
develop individual growth curve models using mixed effects regressions to detect the
influence of the various PSN measures on crime and violence rates over time.
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Predicting Treatment Assignment
The non-random assignment to the treatment group can potentially undermine
necessary assumptions needed to make causal arguments in experimental research, a
problem common in observation studies (see, Berk 2003). Following Berk (Berk, Li and
Hickman 2005) and others (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), we use propensity scores to
adjust for this problem. In short, propensity scores are the estimated probability of
membership in each of the treatment groups that account for confounding variables
between the outcome of interest (homicide) and the selection of treatment groups. For
example, we know that the social factors described above are highly correlated with both
homicide and being selected as a PSN treatment group—i.e., PSN districts were selected
because of their high homicide levels and they also tend to be the poorer, more socially
isolated, etc. Adding such control variables and the PSN treatment variables into the
same equation thus produces high levels of collinearity between variables that undermine
the parameter estimates and their respective p-values. The use of propensity scores
corrects for this by producing an adjusted treatment score that accounts for factors that
are correlated both with homicide rates and with the assignment of beats to treatment or
control groups. We estimate propensity scores as the predicted values from a separate
logistic regression equation regressing the dummy PSN variable on the three
neighborhood structure characteristics and a spatial lag term of 1999-2000 baseline
homicide counts. TABLE 3 presents the results.
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TABLE 3 shows that the probability of being the treatment groups is highly
correlated with the three factor scores plus the measure of spatial autocorrelation.25 On
average, the PSN beats are less disadvantaged but more stable than the comparison
groups—i.e., they represent highly immobile and relatively poor segments of the city’s
population. The Immigration variable is significant and negative because both the
treatment and control groups are predominately African American. The strong and
significant Spatial Lag predictor accounts for obvious clustering of high-homicide beats.
The predicted values from this equation are used as the main treatment variable in
the estimation models to adjust for collinearity between treatment assignment and the
factors that predict treatment assignment.

Growth Curve Models
We developed individual growth curve models to estimate the effects of PSN
interventions on beat-level change over the observation period. Models were estimated
using linear mixed models that contain both fixed and random effects (e.g., Singer and
Willet 2003).26 We use a two-level model that predicts within beat trajectories at level
1and between beat variation in trajectories at level 2 using the predicted level 1 intercepts
and slopes as outcomes. Models were estimated predicting each outcome from the PSN
main effect (propensity score) and the several separate PSN component variables. In all
models, we treat time as both a random and fixed effect to explain the time effects as well
25

Furthermore, and consistent with the notion of propensity scores, the coefficients in this model are
remarkably similar to those predicting homicide in Chicago (e.g. Morenoff et al. 2001; Papachristos and
Kirk 2005)
26
We tested several additional linear and non-linear models as well as various transformations of the time
variable. No notable changes occurred in the direction, significance, or magnitude of the coefficients vis-àvis other model parameters. Therefore, we felt that the linear models adequately and parsimoniously
represent the data.
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as change over time (Singer and Willet 2003). Furthermore, with the exception of the
PSN dummy variable, all of the predictors are time variant and, thus, also experience
change over time; to capture this, we also include interactions of each variable with time.
REML methods are used to develop linear parameter estimates that depend on an
autoregressive covariance structure rather than on the fixed effects.
The general composite two-level model follows the form:
(1)

Yij = [γ00 + γ10TIME + γ01PropensityScore + γ11(PropensityScore * TIME) +
γ02PSN + γ21(PSN * TIME)] + [ζ01 + ζ1iTIME + εij] ,

where Propensity Score represents the predicted values from the logit model in TABLE 3
and PSN represents the various PSN dosage variables described above. The cross-level
interactions with TIME identify whether the effects of TIME differ by levels of the
theoretical predictors—i.e., whether the PSN variables are, in fact, associated with a
decrease in the outcome variables over the observation period.

RESULTS
Overall, the treatment districts experienced a 37 percent drop in quarterly
homicide rates during the observation period. The average quarterly homicide rate
decreases to 24.2 per quarter after PSN compared to 38.2 before PSN (one-sided t-test, t
= 4.18, p = .000). FIGURE 5 shows the aggregate quarterly homicide rates in the treatment
area before and after the start of the PSN prosecutions and offender notification meetings.
Although a modest decline begins around June of 2002, a steep decline in monthly rates
begins just after the start of the PSN forums in January 2003 and continuing to the
present.
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During the same time period, the city as a whole and the control districts also
experienced a decline in homicide, though it was less pronounced. FIGURE 6 compares
the smoothed trendlines for the treatment and control groups as well as the overall city
rates and the city excluding the PSN and control districts. The trendlines show that
although the rates decline for all groups over this time period, the treatment groups
experience the steepest decline. This figure also shows that the control group experiences
a slight but non-significant increase in homicide rates towards the end of the data
collection period rising from 23.6 to 25.1 (one-sided t-test, t = -.51, p = .698).
An examination of overall declining homicide trends suggests that the rates in the
treatment areas fell faster than the rates in the comparison group. However, such a visual
examination captures neither the variation within and between police beats nor the impact
of any of the substantive predictor variables. The growth curve models estimate
individual trajectories for each of the police beats in the assignments groups and then
assess the effects of the various parameters on the variation in individual growth
trajectories. TABLE 4 summarizes the effects of the time-varying PSN dosage variables
on the outcome measures, controlling for the propensity scores described earlier. We
focus on and report the coefficients for the interactions of each PSN variable with time to
identify the effects of PSN on the rate or slope of change over time. In each
specification, we include the predicted value of the PSN dummy variable (i.e., the beat’s
propensity score), and then successively test the effects of the PSN measure in
combination with its various components.
The first row of TABLE 4 shows a negative and statistically significant effect of
the PSN dummy variable (the predicted value the PSN dummy, adjusted for the
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neighborhood covariates) on homicides (β = -.052 , p = .000) and gun homicides (β = 053, p = .000) but a non-significant effect on gang homicides (β = -.011 , p = .235) and
aggravated assaults and batteries (β = -.012 , p = .159). The exponentiated coefficient is
.95, suggesting that PSN produces declines in the quarterly homicide rate and gang
homicide rate of a police beat by approximately 5 percent.
TABLE 4 also shows that the strongest PSN dimension associated with declining
beat-level homicide rates is the percent of offenders in a beat who attend a forum (β = 0.765 , p = .084). This suggests that increasing the percentage of offenders in the beat
who have attended a meeting by 1 percent is associated with an approximately 40 percent
decrease in the beat-level log homicide rate. The association also holds for declining
beat-level gun homicide (β = -.782, p = .072) but is not significant for aggravated
assaults and batteries (β = -.063, p = .744). The largest effect size of this parameter is on
gang-related homicide (β = -.951 , p = .001) perhaps implying that the dissemination of
the PSN message occurs rapidly within the gang context, a matter we discuss in the
conclusion.
The number of ATF gun seizures is negatively associated with gun homicides (β
= -.002, p = .042), but just misses statistical significance for overall homicides at the most
relaxed significance level (β = -.001 , p = .273). While the coefficients may appear
small, recall that this is measure per gun and that Chicago recovers more weapons than
any other city in the country (ATF 2000).27 Translating this coefficient into a per gun
percentage suggests that the log gun homicide rate decreases by approximately 2 percent

27

Between 1995 and 2002, for example, the Chicago Police Department recovered an average of 14,000
guns per year (Annual Reports, selected years).
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for every ten guns recovered in a beat. Put another way, the log gun homicide rate
decreases by about 18 percent for every 100 guns recovered.
Like gun seizures, the number of federal prosecutions is also associated with
small decrease in the log homicide rate (β = -.031 , p = .075). This dimension is just
marginally associated with gun homicides (β = -.024, p = .150) and gang homicides (β =
-.017 , p = .128) at the most relaxed significance level (p < .25). Unlike gun seizures,
however, the number of federal prosecutions in relatively low vis-à-vis the total number
of gun offenses.28 To date, 265 PSN cases have been convicted, sentenced, or plead.
Thus, while the overall influence of this dimension is probably low relative to the other
PSN dimensions. While the number of prosecutions in the assignment groups has a small
effect on declining homicide trajectories, we find no significant incapacitation effect
associated with number of person-months received in from federal prosecutions on any of
the outcome variables.
Finally, the last row in TABLE 4 shows that a negative and statistically significant
relationship between the cumulative index of components with homicide (β = -.025, p =
.005), gun homicide (β = -.023 , p = .008), and gang homicide (β = -.008 , p = .180) rates.
This suggests that those beats in the higher quintiles of the dosage variables experience
greater decreases in homicide rates. Unilaterally increasing the PSN dosage by, say,
holding more forums, increasing the prosecutions, or recovering more weapons is
associated with such a decrease. The magnitude of the coefficients in TABLE 4 suggests
that largest of these effects comes from the forums. At the same time, we observed no
effects of PSN on aggravated battery and assaults (β = .002, p = .774). Battery and assault
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In the present data, for example, there is a 12:1 ratio of gun seizures to gun homicides compared to a
.04:1 ratio of federal prosecutions to gun homicides.
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are higher rate offenses, and perhaps the population involved is more heterogeneous with
less exposure to the PSN individual-level interventions such as the forums or
prosecutions. The narrow effects of PSN on homicides and gun violence confirm the
validity of its specific theoretical focus as an apparently effective strategy to reduce gun
violence.

Alternative Explanations: Operation Ceasefire
We find that beat-level homicide rates dropped faster in the PSN beats compared
to the control group after controlling for factors commonly associated with homicide and
the non-random method of group assignment. FIGURE 7 summarizes this relationship
showing the fitted values and 95-percent confident intervals around the parameter
estimates from the two-level models regressing the beat level log homicide rate on the
propensity scores predicting group assignment. As seen in FIGURE 7, the PSN beats
experience a greater rate of change over the observation period bringing them to
homicide levels similar to those of the control group. In contrast, the control beats
demonstrate only a modest decline in the quarterly log homicide rate after controlling for
between group differences.
Consistent with our hypotheses and the working assumptions of the PSN
taskforce, multi-level analysis suggests that four of the five substantive predictors as well
as the index of components are negatively associated with the homicide. Individually,
the percentage of gun offenders in a beat who have attended a PSN forum appears to have
the largest effect of all the PSN indicators, particularly on gang-related homicides. The
only variable not to have a significant effect was the person-month sentence received
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from federal PSN prosecutions. None of the PSN variables were associated with a
decline in arrest for aggravated assaults or aggravated batteries. This might signal the
limited effect of PSN on crimes other than homicide, and may reflect the heterogeneity of
the risk pool of individuals and situations where non-lethal assaults are more likely to
occur. The narrow focus of the PSN efforts may not reach this broader group of wouldbe offenders. Of course, it might also be that for crimes other than homicides, arrest
records better reflect police activity than crime trends per se.29
Our quasi-experimental design and statistical models lend considerable support
for the influence of PSN on declining crime rates in the PSN districts as compared to the
control districts. One line of alternative reasoning, however, might suggest that other
activities within the PSN areas—such as other police activities, major social or political
changes, or other crime and community strategies—may also be responsible for the
observed trends. Indeed, two other obvious interventions occurred within the same time
period—the use of police surveillance cameras and a street-level intervention component
of the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (a.k.a., Operation Ceasefire).30 While the
detailed analysis of each of these interventions is beyond the scope of this paper and data
availability of the authors, it is significant to note that the overall message of both of
these interventions intertwine with PSN.31

29

It should be noted, however, that clearance rates of arrests relative to reported incidents for these
variables has been consistently around 40 percent (Chicago Police Department Annual Reports, selected
years). If police activity had increased—i.e., police began making more arrests for these crimes—one
might expect clearance rates to also increase during this period, which they did not.
30
The Chicago “Operation Ceasefire” is organizationally distinct from the Boston program of the same
name, although the two share a penchant for street-level interventions.
31
Presently, data on the location and dates of the police surveillance cameras has not been made available.
Data on Operation Ceasefire can be gleamed from the organizations annual reports (Prevention 2005) but
the organization is only now, ten years after its inception, undergoing a process of external evaluation.
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On the one hand, surveillance cameras, like the message delivered at the forums,
support the notion of increased enforcement of violent crime. While in the forums,
offenders repeatedly hear that they are being “targeted” for enforcement and the cameras
may simply reinforce this message. Since the Chicago Police Department plays a visible
and active role in PSN, cameras thus seem to reinforce the PSN message—it might be
irrelevant that offenders do not know that PSN and the cameras are not necessarily part of
the same political program.32 On the other hand, Operation Ceasefire has not only been
an active participant in the PSN forums but they also serve as a direct link to services that
PSN tries to provide to offenders. Operation Ceasefire is specifically charged with
working with the ex-offender and gang population (see, their website at www.
Ceasefirechicago.org).
However, two findings suggest that the results presented here more closely
coincide with the PSN program or at least imply some additive effect between PSN and
other initiatives in the treatment areas—the timing of the decline and preliminary analysis
of Operation Ceasefire areas. First, the observed decline in the treatment area occurs
after the commencement of the offender forums in January 2003. The surveillance
cameras went up in August 2003, after the beginning of the observed decline. Operation
Ceasefire began its street-worker component in 1999 and homicide rates actually
increased after the commencement of the program, thus violating a basic principle of
experimental logic that the effect must always follow the treatment (Shadish, Cook, and

32

Other police initiatives during this time may have had a similar additive effect on neighborhood crime
indicators; for a list of such programs, see Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005). As a broad evaluation of such
increased police activity, analysis similar to those presented above were also conducted using firearm
related arrests as a control for police activity. Arrest rates were non-significant and did not affect the PSN
coefficients.
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Campbell 2002). In these regards, the cameras may provide an additive effect to PSN
whereas PSN may actually be adding to the reported “success” of Operation Ceasefire.
Second, the majority of the geographic areas where Operation Ceasefire operates
are within the PSN boundaries—50 percent of the police beats in which Operation
Ceasefire Operates are PSN beats. Preliminary analysis by the authors suggest that when
controlling for the social, demographic, and PSN factors describe here, no statistically
significant effect in the declining homicide rates during the observation period can be
attributable purely to the presence of Operation Ceasefire in the PSN treatment area.
Using the basic two-level model described above, TABLE 5 lists the summary of
Operation Ceasefire and PSN Effects controlling for the three neighborhood structural
factors and the spatial lag of homicide. Like the PSN variable, the Operation Ceasefire
variable is constructed as a dummy variable for each of the police beats in which
Ceasefire was operating as of 2005 (1 = treatment , 0 = control). An interaction term
between PSN and Ceasefire is also used. TABLE 5 displays the time variant coefficients
in a series of additive models in which the PSN dummy variable and interaction terms are
added to a simple beat-level analysis of Operation Ceasefire.
Model 1 in TABLE 5 shows no statistically significant association between the
dummy Operation Ceasefire variable with homicide (β = -.0002, p = .914) after
controlling for the social structure and spatial lag variables. The addition of the PSN
dummy variable (β = -.052, p = .000) in Model 2 yields a nearly identical negative
coefficient as it does in the models without the Ceasefire variable (compare with row one
in TABLE 4). The interaction term also shows no statistical significance (β = -.028, p =
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.486), although it does slightly diminish the parameter estimate of the PSN dummy
variable.
While these preliminary analyses lend further support to the measured PSN
effects, future research should consider additional competing hypotheses, modeling
strategies, and the competition among multiple causal factors that are not only entangled
with one another but that are endogenous with the test conditions. Like Berk et al.
(2005), we encourage careful analysis of such endogeneity and caution in the dangers of
observational studies that risk violating such assumptions.

CONCLUSIONS
The Chicago PSN taskforce translated the national PSN agenda into several
strategies aimed at reducing homicides in the areas of the city experiencing the highest
levels of gun violence. The taskforce crafted multiple supply- and demand-side
strategies, focusing heavily on those individuals most likely to be involved in firearm
violence—the ex-offender population with criminal history containing a gun offense. In
accordance with the Chicago objective, our analysis suggests that the PSN target areas
did indeed experience a significant decline in homicides at a faster rate than similar
control areas or the city as a whole. Therefore, we attribute at least partial responsibility
of this decline to PSN efforts. In this regard, the policy cascade following Boston’s
Operation Ceasefire and Richmond’s Project Exile appears to have resulted in some
effective gun reduction strategies in Chicago.
However, while such aggregate models speak to the associate between various
program aspects and the observed crime trends, they do not speak to the mechanisms

41
behind them. For example, the multi-level models suggest that much of the observed
decline comes from the offender forums, but it is not clear from the aggregate data
exactly what aspect of the forum appears to be associated with the observed drop in
homicide. Is the effect flowing from the distribution of the law enforcement message?
Does the format of the meeting matter? Perhaps the information regarding community
supports makes the difference? Or, perhaps the forum attendees are inspired by the
“testimony” of the ex-offender who has turned his life around. Maybe the effect is driven
by the multiple messages delivered at the forums and supported by the other PSN efforts.
Individual-level data on the offenders themselves is needed to answer such questions.
A two-pronged follow-up strategy will be used to address such questions. First,
we are presently in the process of analyzing recidivism data on all offenders who have
attended the forums and similar gun offenders in the rest of the city. Preliminary analysis
suggests that gun offenders in the PSN districts are less likely to re-offend using a gun,
but the data is heavily censored as most attendees have not been out of prison for much
longer than 2 years. Namely, it is difficult to make any definite conclusions at this time
because there are so few “failures.” By January 2003, the first cohort of forum attendees
will have been “on the streets” for a full three years, thus presenting a better opportunity
to explore how such individual behaviors affect the larger patterns observed here.
Second, we are presently in the process of data collection on a survey with known
gun offenders in the PSN and control areas that focuses specifically on how the social
networks of offenders influence (a) patterns of gun offending, (b) perceptions of authority
and legitimacy, (c) operations of illicit gun markets, and (d) the overlap of pro-social and
deviant networks. One of the main goals of PSN was to alter the structures of such
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networks by altering normative perceptions of gun use and spreading information about
its potential consequences. Program initiatives such as the forums and school based
programs are specifically geared towards this end. The dissemination of the PSN
message through offender forums might be utilizing the tight network of interaction and
communication among offenders, especially gangs (Kennedy, Braga and Piehl 1997;
McGloin 2005; Papachristos 2005), and phenomenon commonly found in the diffusion of
information in a market (e.g., Balkin 1998; Burt 1987; Valente 1995). Because those
actively involved in using, buying, or otherwise involved with guns possess the most
knowledge of the problem, we intend on collecting primary data on such matters directly
from offenders.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT
WORKS CITIED
Balkin, J. M. 1998. Cultural software: a theory of ideology. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Beale, Susan Sun. 1997. "What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social,
Psychological, and other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law." Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1:23-66.
Becker, Gary. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of
Political Economy 76.
Berk, Richard. 2003. Regression Analysis: A Constructive Critique. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage Publications.
—. 2005. "Knowing When to Fold 'em: An Essay on Evaluating the Impact of Ceasefire,
Compstat, and Exile." Criminology and Public Policy 4:451-466.
Berk, Richard, Azusa Li, and Laura Hickman. 2005. "Statistical Difficulties in
Determining the Role of Race in Capital Cases: A Re-analysis of Data from the
State of Maryland." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 21:365-390.
Bishop, Donna. 2000. "Juvenile Offenders in the Criminal Justice System." in Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Braga, Anthony A., Phillip J. Cook, and David M. Kennedy. 2003. "The illegal supply of
firearms." Pp. 123-261 in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, edited by
Michael Tonry.
Braga, Anthony A., David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, and Anne Morrison Piehl. 2001.
"Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of
Boston's Operation Ceasefire." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
38:195-225.
Braithwaite, John. 1999. "Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts." Crime and Justice 25:26-.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 2000. "Crime Gun Trace Reports
(2000) National Report." edited by Department of the Treasury.
Burt, Ronald S. 1987. "Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural
Equivalence." American Journal of Sociology 92:1287-1335.
Cook, Philip J., Stephanie Molliconi, and Thomas B. Cole. 1995. "Regulating Gun
Markets." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86:59-92.
Cusson, Maurice, and Pierre Pinsonneault. 1986. "The Decision to Give up Crime." in
The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives of Offending, edited by
Derek B Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Decker, Scott H., Richard T. Wright, and Scott Logie. 1993. "Perceptual Deterrence
among Residential Burglars: A Research Note." Criminology 31:135-147.

44
Fagan, Jeffrey. 2002. "This Will Hurt Me More than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency." Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics, and Public Policy 16:101-149.
Fagan, Jeffrey, and Garth Davies. 2004. "The Natural History of Neighborhood
Violence." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 20:127-147.
Fagan, Jeffrey, Aaron Kupchik, and Akiva Liberman. 2003. "Be Careful What You Wish
For: The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders." in Columbia Law School,
Public Law Research Paper No. 03-61.
Feld, Barry C. 1996. Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Fenny, Floyd. 1986. "Robbers as Decision-Makers." in The Reasoning Criminal:
Rational Choice Perspectives of Offending, edited by Derek B Cornish and
Ronald V. Clarke. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Hunter, Albert (Ed.). 1985. Private, Parochial, and Public Social Orders: The Problem
of Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Kennedy, D. M., Anthony A. Braga, and Anne. M. Piehl. 1997. "The (Un)Known
Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston." in Crime Mapping and
Crime Prevention, edited by David Weisburd and Tom McEwen. Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press.
Kleck, Gary, Brion Sever, Spencer Li, and Marc Gertz. 2005. "The Missing Link in
General Deterrence Research." Criminology 43:623-659.
Knox, George W., and Andrew V. Papachristos. 2002. The Vice Lords: A Gang Profile
Analysis. Peotone, IL: National Gang Crime Research Center.
Kuran, Timur, and Cass Sunstein. 1998. "Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation."
Standford Law Review 51:683.
Lempert, Richard. 1984. "From the Editor." Law and Society Review 18:505-514.
Levitt, Steven D. 2002. "Deterrence." in Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control, edited
by James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia. Oakland, CA: ICS Press.
—. 2003. "Comment on Raphel and Ludwig." in Evaluating Gun Policy, edited by Jens
Ludwig and Philip J. Cook. Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press.
Ludwig, Jens. 2004. "Better Gun Enforcement, Less Crime." in Paper Presented at the
University of Chicago Law School: University Chicago.
McGloin, Jean Marie. 2005. "Policy Intervention Considerations of a Network Analysis
of Street Gangs." Criminology and Public Policy 4.
Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2001.
"Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of
Urban Violence." Criminology 39:517-559.

45
Nagin, Daniel S., and Raymond Paternoster. 1994. "Personal Capital and Social Control:
The Deterrence Implications of a theory of Individual Differences in Criminal
Offending." Criminology 35:581-606.
Nagin, Daniel S., and Pogoarsky. 2001. "Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence."
Criminology 39.
Papachristos, Andrew V. 2001. "A.D., After the Disciples: The Neighborhood Impact of
Federal Gang Prosecution." Peotone, IL: National Gang Crime Research Center.
—. 2005. "Murder Markets: Network Contagion and the Social Order of Gang
Homicide." Unpublished Paper. Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
Papachristos, Andrew V., and David S. Kirk. 2005. "Neighborhood Effects on Street
Gang Behavior." in Studying Youth Gangs, edited by James Short, F. and Lorine
A. Hughes. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press.
Paternoster, Raymond, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman, and Lawrence Sherman. 1997.
"Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault."
Law and Society Review 31:163-204.
Piehl, Anne Morrison, Suzanne J. Cooper, Anthony A. Braga, and David M. Kennedy.
2003. "Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs." The Review
of Economics and Statistics 85:550-558.
Piquero, Alex R., and George Rengert. 1999. "Studying Deterrence with Active
Residential Burglars." Justice Quarterly 16:451-452.
Prevention, Chicago Project for Violence. 2005. "10th Anniversary Report." Chicago, IL:
The Chicago Project for Violence Prevention.
Raphel, Steven, and Jens Ludwig. 2003. "Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of
Project Exile." in Evaluating Gun Policy, edited by Jens Ludwig and Philip J.
Cook. Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press.
Rosenbaum, Dennis P., and Cody Stephens. 2005. "Reducing Public Violence and
Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department."
edited by University of Illinois at Chicago Center for Research in Law and
Justice: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.
Rosenbaum, P.R., and D.R. Rubin. 1983. "The Central Role of Propensity Scores in
Observational Studies of Causal Effects." Biometrika 70:41-55.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango, and Eric Baumer. 2005. "Did Ceasefire, Compstat,
and Exile Reduce Homicide?" Criminology and Public Policy 4:419-450.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Felton Earls. 1999. "Beyond Social
Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children." American
Sociological Review 64:633-660.

46
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods
and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." Science 277:918924.
Shadish, W.R., T.D. Cook, and D.T. Campbell. 2002. Experimental and QuasiExperimental Design for Generalized Causal Inference. Boston, MA: HoughtonMifflin.
Shover, Neal. 1996. Great Pretenders: Pursuits and Careers of Persistent Thieves.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Silberman, Matthew. 1976. "Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence." American
Sociological Review 41:442-461.
Singer, Judith D., and John B. Willet. 2003. Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis:
Modeling Change and Event Occurrence. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Singer, Simon I. 1996. Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and
Juvenile Justice Reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tittle, Charles R. 1980. Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence.
New York: Praeger.
Tittle, Charles R., and Alan R. Rowe. 1974. "Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates: A
Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis." Social Forces 52:455-462.
Toby, Jackson. 1964. "Is Punishment Necessary?" Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology, and Police Science 55:332-337.
Torbert, Patricia, and et al. 1996. "State Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime." edited by
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Tyler, Tom R. 1990. Why People Obey the Law.
Tyler, Tom R. 2003. "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law."
Crime and Justice 30:283-.
Valente, Thomas W. 1995. Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovation. Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Walsh, Dermot. 1986. "Victim Selection Procedures among Economic Criminals: The
Rational Choice Perspective." in The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice
Perspectives of Offending, edited by Derek B Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Wilson, James Q., and Richard Hernstein. 1985. Crime and Human Nature. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Wright, Bradley R. E., Avshalom Caspi, Terrie E. Moffitt, and Ray Paternoster. 2004.
"Does the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals?
Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime." Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 41:180-213.

47
Wright, James D., and Peter Rossi. 1985. Armed Criminals in America: A Survey of
Incarcerated Felons. Ann Arobr, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Reserach.
Wright, Richard T., and Scott H. Decker. 1994. Burglars on the Job: Streetlife and
Residential Break-Ins. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Zimring, Frank E. 1999. American Youth Violence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins. 1973. Deterrence; the legal threat in crime
control. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

48

TABLE 1. Social and Crime Indicators
City (All Beats) (N = 281)
Crime Measures
2002 Homicide Rate per 100,000 (total)
2002 Gang-Related Homicide Rate per 100,000 (total)
2002 Aggravated Assault & Aggravated Battery Arrest
Rate per 100,000 (total)

Total Population

PSN Beats (N = 24)

22.3 (648)

49.6 (102)

75.5 (115)

4.5 (133)

7.8 (16)

13.8 (21)

862.2 (25005)

1851.9 (3812)

2005.4 (3053)

215.6 (6252)

438.2 (902)

620.8 (945)

20002 Average ATF Gun Seizure Rate per 100,000
Control Variables
% Households w/ Public Assistance
% High School Graduates > 25 years-old
% Non-White
% Youth (ages 15 to 25)
% Households Linguistically Isolated
% Renter
% Foreign Born
% Household with Female Head
% Same Residence in Last 5 Years
% Below Poverty Level
% In Labor Force

Control Beats (N = 30)

Mean
0.100
0.699
0.655
0.158
0.090
0.594
0.169
0.133
0.545
0.237
0.594
2,895,700

SD
0.075
0.157
0.317
0.063
0.104
0.199
0.165
0.097
0.127
0.141
0.099

Mean
0.143
0.566
0.806
0.203
0.095
0.59
0.154
0.181
0.601
0.325
0.517
257,057

SD
0.064
0.1
0.229
0.027
0.123
0.122
0.189
0.071
0.071
0.099
0.056

Mean
0.175
0.599
0.973
0.214
0.013
0.676
0.021
0.244
0.625
0.345
0.516
155,128

SD
0.047
0.048
0.026
0.017
0.021
0.081
0.024
0.04
0.042
0.075
0.055
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TABLE 2. Factor Loadings of Neighborhood Structural Variables
Factor
Loadings
Deprivation
% Households with Public Assistance
% High School Graduates
% Non-White
% Youth
% Female Headed Households
Median Household Income
% Below Poverty Line
% In Labor Force

0.77
0.80
0.77
0.93
0.76
0.49
0.67

Immigrant Concentration
% Households Linguistically Isolated
% Foreign Born

0.95
0.95

Residential Stability
% Renter
% In House Same Year
Total Population

0.92
0.57
0.59

50
TABLE 3. Propensity Score Analysis of Being in PSN Treatment Group on Social and
Spatial Factors

Coeff.

SE

Z

P > |z|

Deprivation
Concentrated
Immigration

-1.46

0.252

-5.78

0.000

-1.90

0.202

-9.41

0.000

Residential Stability

1.21

0.150

8.10

0.000

Spatial Lag (Moran's I)

1.68

0.151

11.09

0.000

constant

-0.895

0.218

-4.11

0.000

BIC =1363
N = 1296
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TABLE 4. Summary of PSN Effects by Components and Crime Index (Slopes, Exp(B), Standard Errots, and p-values), 1999 to 2004.

Homicides (logged)

Gun Homicides
(logged)

Gang Homicides
(logged)

Aggravated Battery
(logged)

PSN (Dummy)

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.052
0.949
0.013
0.000

-0.053
0.948
0.013
0.000

-0.011
0.989
0.008
0.235

-0.012
0.988
0.008
0.159

Percent Offenders Attend
Forum

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.765
0.465
0.442
0.084

-0.782
0.457
0.431
0.072

-0.951
0.386
0.285
0.001

-0.063
0.939
0.193
0.744

ATF Seizures

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.001
0.998
0.001
0.273

-0.002
0.998
0.001
0.042

-0.00009
1.000
0.0007
0.894

0.003
1.003
0.003
0.325

Prosecutions (logged)

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.031
0.969
0.017
0.075

-0.024
0.976
0.017
0.150

-0.017
0.983
0.011
0.128

0.007
1.007
0.007
0.368

Person-Month Sentences
(logged)

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.003
0.997
0.005
0.658

-0.003
0.997
0.005
0.943

0.002
1.002
0.003
0.490

-0.02
0.980
0.002
0.298

Index of Components
(logged)

Coeff
Exp(B)
SE
p-value

-0.025
0.975
0.008
0.005

-0.023
0.977
0.008
0.008

-0.008
0.992
0.006
0.180

0.002
1.002
0.005
0.774

PSN Predictor
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TABLE 5. Summary of Operation Ceasefire and PSN Effects on Log Homicide Rate(Slopes, Exp(B), Standard Errots, and p-values),
1999 to 2004

Coeff

Operation Ceasefire
(dummy)

Exp(B)
SE
p-value

Model 1
0.002
1.002
0.132
0.914

Coeff

PSN
(dummy)

Exp(B)
SE
p-value

Model 2
0.009
1.009
0.019
0.723

Model 3
0.028
1.028
0.034
0.403

-0.052
0.949
0.013
0.000

-0.049
0.952
0.014
0.000

Coeff

PSN * Operation
Ceasefire

BIC

-0.028
0.972
0.041
0.486

Exp(B)
SE
p-value
4931

4843

4850
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PSN Programs and Initiatives

State Court
Crime

Ex-Offender
Population

• Community &
Media
Outreach
• School Program

• Offender
Notification
Letters
• Offender
Notification
Meetings

Federal Court

MultiAgency Gun
Teams and
Task Forces

Case Review of all
gun cases by local
and federal
prosecutors.
Decision at which
level to prosecute.

Disposition

Total Population

Arrest

General Model of Offending and
Criminal Justice System

FIGURE 1. Structure of Major PSN Strategies and Relation to Offending Process
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FIGURE 2. ATF Gun Seizures and Homicides in Chicago, 2002
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FIGURE 3. Annual Homicide Rates by Assignment Group, 1991 to 2004
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FIGURE 4. Distribution of Index of PSN Components by Group Assignment
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FIGURE 5. Monthly Homicide Rate in PSN Treatment Group, 2001 to 2004
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FIGURE 6. Smoothed Monthly Homicide Rates by PSN Group Assignment, 2001 to 2004
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FIGURE 7. Fitted Linear Growth Curves of Log(Homicide Rate) on Predicted PSN Propensity
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